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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH R. 
BAGNALL, and FLORENCE BAGNALL, 
. . . Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
vs. 
SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an 
Idaho corporation, et . a l . , 
. . . Defendants and 
Counter Appellants. 
Case No. 13 753 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves an action to forfeit a real estate agreement for 
alleged failure to make the required installments, and to quiet title to some 
570 acres of land in the plaintiffs. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Court denied the defendants1 motion for judgment on the 
verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and granted judgment in favor 
of the plaintiffs, and against the defendants forfeiting the real estate agreement 
and quieting title in the plaintiss, except for an undivided 1/2 interest in 140. 15 
acres, which the Court, by Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title, 
awarded to United Paint and Colors. Plaintiff's appeal from the Summary 
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Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title is also pending before this honorable court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants (defendants ) seek reversal of the Judgment of 
Forfeiture, and seek to have judgment entered in their favor dismissing the 
complaint of the plaintiff and reinstating the contract. Defendants further seek 
an award and judgment for attorney fees and costs, and to have the matter 
remanded back to the District Court for a determination of damages, adjustments 
and offsets due defendants from the plaintiffs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts contained in defendants1 (Suburbias1) appeal 
brief on file herein is incorporated by reference. Because plaintiffs in their 
so called nEditorial Note11 and ! ,Statement of Fac ts" contained in their brief 
have called into question the integrity of defendants and their counsel; and 
because they have characterized the defendants1 Statement of Facts as "distorted11, 
"astounding", shocking", and "more argument that fact", bearing "but a fleeting 
similarity" to the truth, and so on ad nauseum, defendants have reprinted 
herein as Appendix "A", their statement of facts as originally contained in their 
appeal brief, and have added citations to the record to substantiate each s ta te-
ment contained therein, and the Court is referred to Appendix "A", and asked 
to read it carefully. 
The voluminous collection of distortions, half truths, agruments, and 
outright untruths (lies?), as contained in the Bagnallsf brief, wri t te^by their 
attorney's own admission, strictly from memory, and masquerading as a 
Statement of Facts , are , for the most part, entirely unsupported by the evidence 
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and record, and, in many cases are contradicted by the record. Defendants 
feel it necessary to present the true facts and issues in some detail. The 
correct facts with respect to some of the more important distortions contained 
in the Bagnalls1 Editorial Note and Statement of Facts are as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs, in their Editorial Note, claim that they are unable 
to cite the appropriate pages of the record in support of their nonsensical 
version of the facts because the defendants failed to designate sufficient of the 
record. A careful review of the record will show the plaintiffs1 position to be 
palpable nonsense. Plaintiffs, on page two of their brief set forth certain 
testimony which they allege to be designated by the defendants, and certain 
testimony which they claim was not designated. It is obvious that the wri ter 
> 
of plaintiffs1 brief did not even bother to look at defendants' designation. Had 
he done so he would have found that, in addition to the testimony which he says 
was designated, defendants also designated all of the testimony of Edgar Anderson, 
all of the cross examination of Don V. Tibbs, and the rebuttal testimony of J. R. 
Bagnall. 
Plaintiffs go on to say that defendants foiled to bring up the record 
consisting of the "entire testimony of Judge Don V. Tibbs, Mildred S. Maxfield 
LaVera Maxfield, Leleland Peterson, and John Brown", They neglected to tell • 
the Court that defendants had, in fact, brought up all of the cross examination of 
Don Tibbs, or that LaVera Maxfield did not even testify. The whole implication 
of plaintiffs1 editorial note is to the effect that vast portions of the testimony, 
relevant to the issues to be decided by this court, are missing. Such implication 
simply is not t rue! In addition to the testimony designated by defendants, 
certain additional testimony which was partially prepared by the reporter in 
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response to plaintiffs supplemental designation of the record are also before 
the court. 
A careful examination of notes taken at the tr ial by the undersigned 
writer reveal that the only testimony not before the court is the direct examination 
of J. R. Bagnall (every point covered in direct was carefully re-examined on 
cross): the direct of Don V. Tibbs, (as with J. R, rs direct, every point 
covered on direct with Mr. Tibbs was re-covered on cross): the testimony of LeLand 
Peterson (who testified that he had not been an officer of Suburbia Land): the 
testimony of John Brown (who testified as to the appraised value of the ranch): 
and some cross of Reed Maxfieid (the Court does have 68 pages of Maxfieidrs 
cross). Except for the testimony of LeLand Peterson which may have some 
bearing upon the credibility of Mr. Maxfieid, none of the other ommitted 
testimony has any thing to add to that actually before the Court, a : rn- , 
2. Plaintiffs, in their Editorial Note have further mistated even 
proceedings had before this honorable Court. The writer of plaintiffs brief 
writes about things of which he knows nothing. He states that plaintiffs were 
concerned about the status of the transcript and moved the court to compel 
defendants to designate the entire record. That much of their statement is 
undoubtedly true. Everything else they had to say about their motion and the 
proceedings had thereon is untrue. For instance, plaintiffs state that 
defendants1 counsel (the undersigned writer) stated to the court that the record 
designated would sufficiently cover the disputed areas and that the court fu-
tile ref ore acquiesed in appellants' assertion that the record was adequate. That 
is simply not what happened. The writer did say that, In his opinion, defendants 
had designated ail of the record that they needed. Mr. Ron Boutwell, who was 
appearing as counsel for the plaintiffs made reference to the case of Mitchell Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vs. Mitchell (case no. 13565, filed November 7, 1974) in which Mr. Boutwell's 
client lost for failure to designate any portion of the transcript. After some 
discussion between counsel and the court. Mr. Boutwell stated that he was 
ambivalent in his position and did not wish to pursue his motion. Based upon 
his withdrawl of the motion, the court had no choice but to deny it. Plaintiffs 
then withdrew their supplemental designation of record which had designated ail 
but a small portion of the testimony not previously designated by defendants: 
Plaintiffs further state in their editorial note that they had a portion 
of the balance of the record designated. That statement, without more, is technically 
correct, but to imply that the partial transcript of additional testimony on file 
with the court, and to which they make reference, was filed because they had 
designated only that particular portion, is untrue. They had designated more, but 
changed their minds and withdrew the designation totally. The partial testimony was 
apparently filed because the reporter had already transcribed it before plaintiffs 
changed their minds, had nothing else to do with it, and, therefore, sent it to the 
court to be filed. The Court will note that it was first sent to the clerk of this 
court without the proper certification from the Sanpete County Clerk and was returned 
to Sanpete for certification before it was accepted for filing. 
3. On page five of their brief, plaintiffs state that "one cannot 
readily appreciate Mr. Maxfieldfs demeanore and conduct without seeing him 
in court and without reading the description of the transaction given by Judge 
Tibbsn . Plaintiff then quotes a portion of the cross examination of Mr. Tibbs 
as contained on page 99 of the transcript. Plaintiff fails to inform the court that 
on the same page Mr. Tibbs states that his recollection is different from that 
of the other parties to the transaction (Tr. Bk. 1, p. 99) or that Mr. Reed Maxfield 
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testified that Mr. Tibbs was recalling not Reed Maxfield, but his father, E. R. 
Maxfield. (Maxfield direct, Tr. Bk 2, p. 188). 
4. On page five of their brief, plaintiffs falsely state that Maxfield 
testified on cross examination that the suitcase full of money which he brought 
to the meeting and with which he made payment of the agreed delinquencies 
at the time, came from his transactions with the Unitah Finance Company; that 
the company was insolvent; that he preferred to take his interest in business 
transactions in cash; that he did not believe in bank accounts, checking books, 
or record keeping. .Finally they actually make a factual statement, i. e. that 
none of those "facts" are contained in appellants1 record. I should hope to shout 
they are not. The reason they are not is because the record flatly contradicts 
every one of them. -e;k^ i 
On cross examination (Tr. Bk 3, p. 65, 66) Maxfield stated that the 
Unitah Finance Company, rather than being insolvent, was in fact solvent -
and presently operating under a different name. There is no testimony that the 
money came from Maxfieid's transactions with Unitah Finance Company. In 
fact, on direct (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 174) he stated that he sold his stock in Unitah 
Finance Company and other "Unitah" companies, for a combination of cash and 
other stock. He flatly denied that he "preferred" to take cash, (Maxfield cross 
Tr. Bk. 3, p. 66) or that he did not believe in banks or record keeping. (Cross 
of Maxfield, Tr. Bk. 3, p. 76 & 81). 
5. The first two paragraphs of page six of plaintiffs1 brief makes 
the point that plaintiffs assumed Maxfield had "all the outstanding interests" 
and was willing to take the title in whatever shape it happened to be. This 
contention will be discussed in detail in point I of the argument herein. Suffice 
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it to say that all objective evidence in the record is to the contrary. 
These same two paragraphs make the point that Maxfieid was very 
abrasive and threatening, thereby coercing the Bagnails into signing the 
modification agreement. Again, the record is just the contrary. Mr. Tibbs, 
the Bagnails then attorney, stated on cross examination (Tr. Bk. I, p. 107) 
that Maxfieid did not coerce the Bagnails, and that the arrangement was purely 
voluntary and based upon his recommendation. 
6. On page seven of their brief, plaintiffs state that Maxfieid had 
come to the Bagnails with complicated and fictional stories of title problems 
he was encountering and that none of those problems had any basis in fact. The 
writer will merely refer the court to the judgment in favor of United Paint and 
Colors quieting title to a 1/2 interest in 140. 15 acres of the ranch. That title 
problem certainly seems to have a substantial basis in fact. Likewise, a persual 
of the abstract and other exhibits will demonstrate that Jean Nyberg also alienated 
. 57 acres (which apparently also now belongs to United Paint and Colors) that 1. 5 
acres is inttie name of Caroline Hansen, and that 8. 06 acres are in the name of 
J. A. Bagnail, plaintifffs son. 
7. On page 8 of their brief, plaintiffs make much of the point that the 
Suburbia Land Company of Nevada filed a qualification statement in Utah and 
attached articles that were different from those which had been filed in Nevada. 
The implication is, of course, that there is chicanery afoot. Again, the fraud 
and chicanery is being practised by plaintiffs' counsel. A careful examination 
of the documents submitted by the plaintiffs themselves to support this nonsense 
(Exhibits P 39, 41) will show that the articles attached to the Utah application 
inadvertently left off the first page of the articles, and that the copy of the 
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amendment changing the name to Suburbia, though providing for signatures by 
all responsible officers, was not actually signed by them ail, although the 
original filed in Nevada was. It seems plaintiffs find it necessary to make 
mountains out of molehills and in fact are actively attempting to mislead the 
8. Most of the "facts'1 contained on pages 7, 8, and 9 of plaintiffs 
brief are directed to the issue of alter-ego, and defendants will not attempt to 
correct them (since they do not contest the court fs finding on that point) except 
to say that virtually everything contained therein is not supported anywhere in 
the record before the court, nor would it be supported if the few bits of missing 
testimony were available. . .-. .; 
9. Plaintiffs' counsel on page 11 of their brief makes another false 
statement that the Bagnalls had always paid the taxes on the ranch. Even the 
most careless examination of Mr. Bagnailfs testimony on cross (Tr. Bk. tft#; Z$ 
p, 100) will show that even Bagnall concedes that Suburbia paid the taxes in 1962, 
1964, 1968, and 1969. 
10. On page 11 plaintiffs make the statement that respondents (plaintiffs) 
never knew with whom they were dealing, that Maxfield had an elusive and 
transient air about him, and that he dealt with corporations that came and went 
like the wind. Such a statement is flatly contradicted by the record. Mrs. Bagnall 
on direct (Tr. Bk. 3, p. 43) stated that they dealt only with Reed Maxfield and had 
knowledge of only the one corporation. She flatly denied that they even knew of 
the Nevada or Utah corporations. Mr. Tibbs testified (Tr. Bk. 1, p. 83, 84) that 
transfer of the property into the name of the Nevada corporation was contemplated 
at the time of the signing of the modification agreement in July of 1962, and that 
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he may even have prepared the assignment at that time. If we assume that 
Bagnalls had knowledge of both the Idaho and the Nevada corporation, and then 
maybe forgot about the transfer to the Nevada corporation, there exists 
only one additional corporation with which they would have had to deal -
Suburbia Land Company of Utah, incorporated in 1968. Does this convey to the 
reader any justification for plaintiffs1 statement that corporations were coming 
and going like the wind? 
11. Plaintiffs contend that the record shows that Mr. Maxfield claimed 
to have some $140, 000 in cash in a duffle bag at the time he made the first tender 
in July, 1969. Again plaintiffs are distorting the facts. Maxfield never made 
any such claim. On page 99 of the transcript, Mr. Maxfield, on cross-by 
Jackson Howard testified that he had in excess of $15, 000 in cash on the premises. 
And again in book 2, p. 330 of the transcript he stated that he had approximately 
$20, 000 on hand. Mr. Howard is obviously attempting to mislead the court, or 
his memory is totally untrustworthy. 
12. On page 12 plaintiffs make the statement that the jury, as well 
as the court found that defendants1 tenders were not made in good faith. This 
statement is also untrue. The fact of the matter is that the jury found the tenders 
to be in good faith, and the court overrulled the jury. (See jury verdict form, 
interrogatory no. 12) . 
13. On page 12, plaintiffs again indluge in their fantasies, making 
the assertion that defendants brief devotes a great deal of space showing that 
plaintiffs-respondents were to render a title opinion as soon as possible. 
Defendants brief devoted precisely 18 words in support of that proposition, 
- 9 -
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14. On page 13 plaintiffs make light of the defendants statement 
that the one-half interest in the 140. 15 acres of land comprises the central 
portion of the ranch. They go on to say that it is one of the lesser parts of 
the land, poorly situated, and presently a bog. The testimony of Reed Maxfield 
(Tr. 234 et, seq.) , the testimony of Lynn Nielsen (Tr. Bk. 2, p.204-225) and 
exhibit D-38, all clearly show the relationship of the said 140. 15 acres to the 
res t of the ranch. There is no support in the record whatsoever for plaintiffs1 
characterization of the land. 
15. On page 13, plaintiffs asser t contrary to anything to be found in 
the record, that Phillips Oil Company had checked the title to the property, 
considered the title to be clear and took lease on the basis that the title was 
clear. Such statement is not supported by the record. The truth is, although this 
is not in the record either, that the title opinion rendered by Phillips attorney is 
replete with flaws and defects in title which Phillip's counsel recommends be 
corrected. •.••:.'• . .k^.;-.. 
16. On page 15 of their brief, plaintiffs make much of the fact that 
defendants' counsel, in discussing the July 5, 1969 tender made by Reed Maxfield 
on behalf of Suburbua Land, referred to Mr. Maxfield as the "then president11 of 
Suburbia. Counsel candidly admits that to be an e r ror . Maxfield should have 
been characterized as f,agentM or as "acting on behalf" of Suburbia as he was in 
the very next sentence. Apart from this one oversight, every other statement in 
defendants' Statement of Facts is true and supported by the record. The writer 
apologizes for this one misstatement. * 
17. On page 17 of their alleged "brief" plaintiffs make the statement 
that the $400 payment received by the Bank of Ephriam was received by virtue of 
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an order of the court that it be conditionally held in a separate account. The 
writer challanges plaintiffs to produce such an order, and will even stipulate 
that if such an order can be found by plaintiffs, that it be designated and made a 
part of the record in this case. The statement is simply false. No such order 
exists. Reference to Exhibit D-18 will demonstrate that the payment was 
accepted by the bank with no restrictions and was duly posted to interest. No 
amount of deception and argument to the contrary by the plaintiffs can alter 
the fact. 
18. Counsel becomes weary with the necessity of responding to virtually 
every statement made by the plaintiffs intheir statement of facts. Virtually every 
statement made by the plaintiffs is either flatly untrue, is only partially true, 
or is unsupported by anything in the record. To quote the plaintiffs themselves: 
"It is particularly galling to the (defendants) to have an 
emotional appeal made on 'facts1 that are unsupported 
or refuted by other witnesses in the record and which, 
as presented, can only constitute a fraud upon this 
court ." Plaintiffs1 brief, pp. 17 and 18, Emphasis added. 
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ARGUMENT 
.- POINT I Mvxi^U r\*v.r,-vr. 
RESPONDENTS1 ATTEMPT TO VARY THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE 
MODIFICATION AGREEMENT BY PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED 
The Modification Agreement dated July 16, 1962, read in conjunc-
tion with the letter of July 18, 1962, (which the t r ia l court ruled was a part of 
the Modification Agreement), tells the whole story. If read together and if given 
their obvious meaning, much of the folderol perpetrated by the plaintiffs simply 
disappears. These two documents were prepared by the sel lers1 attorney, and 
the meaning of the words is clear and unambiguous. If the Modification Agreement 
were ambiguous (which we deny), any ambiguity contained therein should be 
construed most strongly against the party selecting the words and drafting the 
Agreement. In other words,it should be construed most strongly against the 
Bagnalls. Bryant vs. Deseret News Publishing Co. , 120 U. 241, 223
 p . 2d. 355; 
27 ALR 2d. 1131; Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance Co. , 106 U. 184, 147 P. 2d. 
310, 152 ALR 12 78; Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 236; 12 Am. Jur . 
Contracts, Sec. 252. 
This common sense rule of construction against the person who 
selected the language is particularly applicable in our case where Mrs. Bagnall 
had 10 years experience in the real estate business (Tr. Bk. 2, pX5 7) during which time 
she (a) wrote contracts, (b) established escrows, (c) showed real properties, 
(d) negotiated contracts, (e) was aware of, and knew the importance of conveying 
good title, (f) was knowledgable about assignments and evidence of ownership. Mr. 
Bagnall had been superintendant of schools for Sanpete County and had been an 
administrator of schools in California (Tr. Bk. 3, p . 2 7). And, of course, Mr. 
-12-
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Tibbs, acting as attorney for the Bagnalls,was an experienced lawyer and fully 
aware of the consequences of what was said and done. 
The modification agreement, drafted by sel lers ' attorney, Don 
V. Tibbs states: 
"This agreement is made to modify a certain Real 
Estate Agreement dated the 1st day of September, 1952 
* * * (the buyers interest having been, according to the 
Buyers herein, conveyed to Suburbia Land Company, 
an Idaho corporation), now designated as Buyers. ff 
The modification agreement goes on to say that: 
nThe Sellers agree to place a Warranty Deed conveying 
good and marketable title to the premises as described 
in said agreement, together with all shares of water 
stock owned by them in Escrow at the Bank of Ephriam, 
Utah." 
57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth the covenants that 
are part of the warranty deed: 
"Such deed when executed . . . (constitutes conveyance) 
with covenants from the grantor . . . that he is lawfully 
seized of the premises; that he has good right to convey 
the same; that he guarantees . . . the quiet possession 
thereof; that the premises are free from all emcumbranees 
?f 
In the face of the clear and unambiguous language of the Modification 
Agreement, and in the face of the statute legislating the effect of a warranty deed, 
the Bagnalls attempt to change the plain meaning by their self serving statements 
that a total stranger (Reed Maxfield) verbaly represented to them that he had 
acquired all outstanding titles and had deeds for them. (Tr. Bk. 2, p . 24), 
Consistent with the Modification Agreement and the purport of the statute, Mr. 
Maxfield claimed that all he bought was the buyers interest under the contract, 
(Tr. Bk. 2, p. 23 9), and the sellers attorney said that he put the buyers 
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representations in the Modification Agreement. (Tr. Bk. I , p . 103). 
Not only is it inconsistent to believe that Mr. Maxfield represented 
he had acquired all outstanding titles and was willing to take the title from 
Bagnalls in whatever condition it should be found, but it is contradictory to the 
testimony of the plaintiffs themselves. During cross examination of J. R. Bagnall 
(Tr. Bkv 2, pp. 23-27), he stated that he asked Maxfield, at the time of the 
formation of the Modification Agreement, such questions as (a) What interest 
do you own? (b) What property do you own? (c) Who did you buy from? (d) What 
did you pay for the interests? (e) What documents do you have? and etc. 
To each of these questions, Mr. Maxfield purportedly replied; "None of your 
business". Further support for the appellants' position is garnered from the 
testimony of plaintiffs' own attorney, Don Tibbs, who stated (T-104, 105) that 
he thought there might be some minor defects which they would have to clear up. 
If plaintiffs are to be believed, we must believe that a total stranger, 
carrying a suitcase full of money, walked unexpectedly into the office of Mr. Tibbs, 
where the Bagnalls just happened to be, demanded that he be recognized as the 
legitimate owner of the ranch claimed to have acquired all outstanding titles, 
refused to divulge any information whatsoever about his acquisition, and, based 
upon such representations by Maxfield, the Bagnalls, upon the advise of their 
attorney, agreed to deliver a warranty deed. (Tr, Bk. 2, p. 25). 
Then, having resolved all questions of title (remember plaintiffs 
claim Maxfield had acquired all defects to his own satisfaction) the Modification 
Agreement, as supplemented by the letter of July 18, 1962 (Exhibit P-6) was 
prepared and makes the following declaration: 
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"So, also, the undersigned agree to clear up any defects 
that may be shown in the title concerning the property as 
set forth in the Modification Agreement, within 18 months 
from date, it being understood that the Abstract shall be 
examined and a Title Opinion rendered as soon as possible. I! 
(Emphasis added. ) 
Where the contract is clear and unambiguous and all of the te rms 
are explicit and certain, as in our case, the contract is not open to construction. 
Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 U. 207, 143 p. 234. Bagnalls attempt to intruduce oral 
testimony to either (a) show that the contract is ambiguous, or (b) change the 
terms of the agreement, is clearly contrary to Utah law. 78-25-16, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 provides as follows: "There can be no evidence of the contents 
of a writing other than the writing itself, except . . . " Certain exceptions not 
pertinent herein are then enumerated. The Utah courts have long held that in 
the absence of fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissable to contradict, 
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a valid written instrument. Fox Film 
Corp. vs. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 U. 279, 17 P. 2d. 294, 90 ALR 1299; Last 
Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P. 2d, 952. 
One must either believe that the Modification Agreement, the July 
18 letter, and the Warranty Deed set forth the understanding of the parties, or, 
one must believe that Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall, along with their attorney, Judge 
Tibbs, were incredibly stupid. It is simply impossible to believe their story 
that they accepted Maxfields alleged representations and, in reliance thereon, 
conveyed to him by warranty deed. Clearly they must have known, at that time, 
that when Maxfield conveyed the property, and defects in title was later discovered, 
they would be bound by their warranties to defend the title for the transferee. Both 
Tibbs and the Bagnalls;would have been keenly aware of such possibility and one 
must conclude that they believed they had good title, not that they relied upon 
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Maxfield's representations, (cf Tibbs testimony Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 104-105; Bagnall 
2 Tr. Bk. 2, p. 23). 
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POINT II 
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ELICIT ANY BELIEVABLE PROOF THAT 
THE DEFENDANTS WERE UNABLE TO PERFORM THEIR TENDER 
Pages 20 to 29 of the respondents arguments a re so shot full of 
e r ro r s , untruths and outright fabrications that it is difficult for the writer to 
respond. Many of the more blatant e r ro r s and fabrications were referred to in 
the Statement of Facts herein. Others, but by no means not all, will be covered 
at this time. 
Practically all of the alleged "facts" referred to on pages 20, 21, 
and 22 of the plaintiff's brief are, by their own admission unsupported by any-
thing before the court. For that reason alone, the alleged "facts" cannot be 
considered by the court. On page 22, plaintiffs state that Maxfield was caught 
in one lie after another. Yet no examples are given except the dubious statement 
that he testified that he did not know that a corporation had to do such things 
as maintain its charter in good standing. Not one other "lie" is reported. It 
is the wr i ter ' s firm belief that plaintiffs failed to enumerate Maxfield's " l ies" 
because there were none of any consequence. Mr. Howard must have been 
thinking of his own client J. R. Bagnall who was in fact caught in one lie after 
another. (See defendants appeal brief, point IX). 
Respondents' argument under their Point II is replete with factual 
inaccuracies, incorrect citations, and outright misstatement of the facts as 
disclosed by the record. On page 23 Mr. Howard states that the court and jury 
BAP 
found the tenders to be made in ge&4 faith. The truth of the matter is that the 
jury found fo£ the defendants on this point (see special interrogatory number 12) 
and the court overrulled the jury and granted the plaintiffs! motion for judgment 
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not withstanding the verdict. 
On page 24 of their brief, respondents go into some detail concerning 
the testimony of Bruce Watkins, Clearfield State Bank manager who testified 
on behalf of the appellants. Plaintiffs brief states that Mr. Watkins testimony 
was to the effect that the most the bank had before it was a loan application made 
out months prior and which had not been acted upon. The references given (Tr. 
Bk. 2, p . 232) makes it very clear that the bank had committed to make the loan 
and would have gone through with it if Maxfieid had pursued it. 
Mr. Howard writes that the loan was to be made upon the security 
of the land in Sanpete County. Again, this is contrary to the testified facts. On 
cross examination (Tr. Bk. 3, p. 51) Mr. Watkins unequivically stated that the 
loan was to be made upon the security of the corporate stock. He goes on to say 
that the value of the stock would depend upon the balance sheet, that a financial 
statement had been submitted and that it showed a net worth of $100, 000 to 
$200,000. (Tr. Bk. 3, p. 49). Contrary to this cited testimony, Mr. Howard 
states that Watkins testified that he had not seen a financial statement. 
Plaintiffs references to the record as contained on pages 24 and 25 
of their brief do not support their statements, In fact, a close examination of the 
transcribed testimony of Bruce Watkins will show that Mr. Howard was deliberately 
trying to confuse the witness by asking such questions: "Suppose you found the 
corporation charter had been revoked in 1968 ? M (Tr. 55). Such a question was 
improper because the corporate charter had not, in fact, been revoked in 1968. 
That was the date the Utah corporation was formed, and it had not been suspended 
until after September 15, 1971. The court is invited to read Mr. Howard's cross 
examination of Mr. Watkins, and form its own conclusions. 
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Plaintiffs constantly, throughout their brief, poke fun at 
defendants testimony concerning the large amounts of cash which Mr. Maxfield 
kept around the house, and attempt to confuse the court with such statements as 
that found on page 22 of their brief wherein it is claimed that Maxfield claimed 
to have $140, 000 in a duffle bag in his closet. As was earl ier pointed out, such 
was not Maxfield's claim. He only claimed to have something in excess of $15, 000 
around the house. Such a claim is not unreasonable in view of the plaintiffs' own 
testimony that he had large amounts of money in a suitcase when they first met him, 
(Bagnall Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 21-22) and in light of Don Tibbs testimony that he had money 
coming out of his pockets, and everywhere. (Tibbs Tr . Bk. 1, p . 99). 
If we examine carefully what was testified to at the t r ia l we find 
the following: 
1. 1962, Reed Maxfield, together with his brother Lindon and 
his father E. R. Maxfield, sold their stock interest in the "Uintahs" for 
$550,000. (Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 174-177). 
2. It was right after this sale that Mr. Maxfield was carrying 
large amounts of cash, and may have had as much as $140, 000 in cash at the ranch, 
although he stated he did not remember having that much in the house. (Maxfield 
Tr . Bk. 2, p . 330). 
3. By 1969, for reasons not entirely clear from the record, much 
of that cash had been spent or was otherwise unavailable to Maxfield. During 
the year 1969, Maxfield had found it necessary to borrow on two occasions from 
the Bank of Ephriam, and, at the time of the July 5, 1969 tender, had on hand 
$15, 000 to $20, 000, and one-half of that sum came from the loans from the Bank 
of Ephriam. (Maxfield Tr . Bk. 2, p . 330). Such amounts of cash on hand, and 
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the propriety of borrowing in limited amounts is entirely consistent with the 
testimony of Mr. Maxfield, and also the testimony of Bruce Watkins, Clearfield 
State Bank branch manager who testified that the Suburbia corporation had a net 
worth, according to the balance sheet of $100, 000 to $200, 000. (Watkins, Tr . Bk. 
3, p. 49). There is nothing inconsistent with the testimony of Maxfield that the 
bank had committed a loan of $15, 000 which, together with the $20, 000 already 
on hand, was believed by Maxfield to be sufficient to pay off the contract in full. 
(Maxfield, Tr . Bk. 2, p. 232). 
As can readily be seen, Maxfield did not, and does not, claim to 
have huge amounts of cash on hand during 1969, and the following years, but 
he does claim to have had sufficient to meet the tenders had they in fact been 
accepted. 
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POINT III 
RESPONDENTS ACCEPTED A PAYMENT AFTER THEIR NOTICE OF 
MAY 25, 1970, AND, THEREFORE REINSTATED THE CONTRACT 
Point V of the plaintiffs1 brief makes the point that this writer, 
"in accordance with appellants usual candor . . . M failed to mention that the 
defendants1 payment of $400 to the escrow, December 1, 1971 was surreptitously 
made to the e.scrow in a deliberate effort to develop a waiver. Even if that be 
true, the operative fact is, did the escrow, as agent for the plaintiff, accept 
the payment or did it not? It is quite evident as pointed out in Point V of 
defendants' brief that the payment was accepted. 
On page 30 of plaintiffs1 brief they again practice deception upon 
the court. Respondents state that the payment was held by the bank in a special 
account by order of Judge Erickson. This writer challanges respondents and 
their counsel to produce any such order by Judge Erickson or anyone else. It 
simply does not exist. They state that appellants did not designate such order. 
It is obvious that we could not designate a non-existant order. As further deception 
practised by the respondents, they refer to plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, as the record 
from the Bank of Ephriam. Exhibit 11 bears the following statement: 
"Not accepted. Court order by Judge Erickson to 
place in special fund. " 
Plaintiffs' attempt to foist this exhibit off on the court as genuine 
is contemptible. Exhibit 11 is a copy of the bank record and contains the above 
notation, written thereon by Bagnall himself. It is not, repeat, not on the original 
record from the bank (Exhibit 18). The plaintiffs' witness from the bank, Edgar 
Anderson stated (Tr. Bk. 1, p . 34) that defendants' Exhibit 18 was the correct 
record, and that the notation on plaintiffs' Exhibit 11 was undoubtedly placed there 
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by Bagnall himself. As is more fully pointed out under Point V of appellants; 
appeal brief, the $400 payment was accepted by the bank, credited to interest, 
the escrow fee withheld, and the balance forewarded to Bagnall, and ultimately 
deposited in his checking account. It is true that he then attempted to reject the 
payment, but such rejection obviously came too late, and the contract was 
therefore re-instated, if in fact, it had ever been validly forfeited at all. 
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POINT IV 
THE RECORD AS DESIGNATED AND AS FILED WITH THE COURT IS 
MORE THAN SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO OVERRULE THE 
TRIAL COURT AND TO AWARD JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR 
Points 1 through VII of defendants1 appeal brief are, for the most 
part, appeals on questions of law and do not depend, in most instances, upon 
any testimony. Where they may depend upon testimony, all revelant testimony 
is before this court. Respondents contend that there is not sufficient record 
before the court upon which to form a decision or upon which it can overrule the 
tr ial court. They then go through a little charade on pages 33 and 34 of their 
brief attempting to show that vast quantities of testimony and exhibits are 
missing. Appellants have, in their Statement of Facts herein, responded to 
some of the false implications of respondents' charade. Some additional 
comment is required at this time. 
On the second line of page 34, plaintiffs point out that defendants 
designated ,fall testimony of Edgar R. Anderson1', which is correct. Then on the 
first line up from the bottom on that same page they state that defendants failed to 
designate "all testimony of Edgar Anderson", which is, of course, incorrect. 
They cannot keep it straight themselves. On the eighth line up from the bottom 
they state that defendants did not designate the testimony of Lavera Maxfield. We 
certainly did not, and could not have done so since she did not testify. In their 
list of other testimony not designated, plaintiffs fail to point out to the court that 
the re-direct of J. R. Bagnall is in fact before the court; that the court has 68 
pages of the cross of Reed Maxfield; that the court has the cross and re-direct of 
Lester R. Romero; that the court has all direct and re-direct of Florence Bagnall; 
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that the testimony of Lynn Nielson is before the court; that the testimony of 
Robert Lord (defendants1 counsel) went only to the question of attorneys fees 
and is not questioned on appeal; nor that the direct testimony of J. R. Bagnall 
and Don V. Tibbs was fully explored on cross and that the cross fairly reflects 
the direct. 
Likewise, plaintiffs do not tell the court that of the exhibits 
allegedly ommited from the designation, the court actually has plaintiffs1 8, 
12, 13, 19 - 26, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41 - 48, and 54 - 58. Contrary to what 
plaintiffs are attempting to tell the court, even though appellants designation 
of exhibits did not include all of appellants exhibits only four (40, 41, 45 and 48) 
are not actually onfile with the court. Those few not before the court are duplicalted 
by other exhibits actually designated, or they had little if any probative value. It 
is the defendants1 position, and it was so stated by the undersigned in appellants1 
motion to strike the plaintiffs1 brief, that all relevent evidence is before the court. 
Rule 75 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the appellant 
shall, within ten days after filing of the notice of appeal, file his designation. 
Within ten days thereafter, any other party to the appeal may serve and file a 
designation of additional portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence. The 
obvious purport of the rule is to allow the appellant to designate those portions 
of the record he feels he needs for his appeal. Then, any other party who feels 
that the designated portion may shortchange him, may file a designation for 
additional portions. If the appellant must designate the entire record, then why 
Rule 75 (a)? And if appellant states that the record as designated fairly reflects 
the t r i a l testimony, and respondent disagrees, he (respondent) should designate 
such additional as he feels necessary. Rule 75 (e) requires that the record be 
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abbreviated and that all matter not essential to the decision of the questions 
presented by the appeal be omitted. That is precisely what appellants have done. 
If plaintiffs do not like it, they should have designated whatever else they felt 
necessary as provided by 75 (a). 
Two varieties of cases have come before the Utah Supreme Court 
in which the failure to provide a complete transcript of the proceedings below has 
been stated as a ground for disposition of the appeal, i. e. (a) those in which no 
transcript at all was provided; and (b) those in which only a partial transcript 
was designated. 
NO TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED. Respondents refer to the case of 
Buchanan vs. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P 2d. 100 (1944) in support of their 
proposition that appellants1 appeal should be dismissed because the entire record 
was not designated. In fact the case is not directly in point because no transcript 
was designated in that case. Even so, the ruling of the court is instructive: 
"On appeal the appellant has the burden of showing 
wherein the t r ia l court erred. If the record is not 
sufficient to determine a material question because 
of the fact that the appellant failed to bring enough 
of it before us, the doubts should be resolved in 
favor of sustaining the judgment. " (Emphasis added. ) 
The reader will note that the court clearly stated that if the record 
were sufficient to determine the question, or if enough of the record were before 
it, it could overrule the t r ia l court. Such a principle is also set forth in the case 
of Watkins vs. Simonds, 385 P. 2d. 154, 14 U. 2d. 406 (1963) in which the Utah 
court said: 
"Judgments of courts are presumed to be correct if 
nothing in the record appears to the contrary, and all 
doubts are resolved in their favor. The record on 
appeal in this case, being devoid of any and aii 
evidence, it must be assumed that the proceedings in 
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the court below established a sufficient basies 
to support and justify the court !s findings, con-
clusions and judgment, n (Emphasis added.) 
In other words, where no transcript is provided, the court, quite 
properly can make no determination as to whether the record sustains the t r ia l 
court or not. 
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED. The recent case of Nagle 
vs. Club Fontainbleu, 17 U. 2d. 125, 405 P. 2d. 346 (1965) is instructive on 
this point. In that case the court stated: 
"Only a partial transcript of the trial , containing 
exerpts from the testimony has been brought here. 
Upon reading it we perceive therein nothing which 
would compel a determination contrary to that made 
by the t r ia l court. " (Emphasis added.) 
Again the court pays homage to the principle that it could reverse 
the court below if there were compelling evidence, even though all had not been 
designated. This wri ter submits that the problem will be discussed by the court 
only in cases involving a partial t ranscript where there has been insufficient 
evidence before the court to reverse the decision below. The majority opinion 
would likely never discuss the problem where they felt there was enough evidence 
before them to reverse . 
Even Rule 10 of the Federal Rules requires only the inclusion of 
all evidence relevent to the findings and conclusion. The wri ter again states 
that, in his opinion, all such relevent testimony is before the court. If 
respondents feel that additional testimony is necessary, they had every opportunity 
virtually 
to bring it up. In fact they did designate-all testimony and exhibits not designated 
by the appellants, and then changed their minds and un-designated the remainder. 
The court s tar ts with the presumption that the judgment of the t r ia l court is 
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sustained by the evidence. When the court has sufficient of the record before it 
to compel a contrary finding, then the presumption that the tr ial court was correct 
must fall. 
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POINT V 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO GIVE APPELLANTS AN ACCOUNTING 
Plaintiffs1 brief states in point III, that "respondents never refused 
to give an accounting to the appellants. n A quick Look at the testimony of Mr. 
Bagnall himself wiLl put the Lie to the above statement. For instance, Mr. 
Barker, attorney for Reed Maxfield, was questioning Mr. Bagnall on the 
feasibility of the buyers obtaining the amount of delinquencies from the bank: 
Q. When you received these requests for an accounting, did you 
ever write back and say, Here 's the information I have that the bank doesn't have, 
you can get the rest of the information from the bank, or something to that 
effect? 
A. No. We were too busy trying to get them to pay something. 
(Bagnall, Tr . Bk. 2, P. 101). 
Again, on page 103, Mr. Howard asks Mr. Bagnall the following 
question: 
MR. HOWARD: The question is, did you call them up and tell 
them what the accounting was: 
THE WITNESS: No. 
MR. HOWARD: I suppose that's it. 
From the foregoing direct testimony, and the implications drawn 
from the testimony as a whole, one can only conclude that no accounting was given 
as requested. 
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POINT VI 
DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO AN ACCOUNTING BOTH BEFORE 
AND AT THE TIME OF THEIR TENDERS 
Plaintiffs, on page 10 of their brief, lists a so called ommission 
of facts not disclosed by the appellants in their appeal brief. Basically they 
say that appellants did not disclose that on the date of the modification agreement 
(July 16, 1962), the balance owing on the contract was $54, 142. 14, and by the 
time of trial, April 22, 1974, the balance had increased to $63, 298. 64. The 
writer admits that the modification agreement states that: 
3" It is believed by the undersigned that as of August 
1, 1962, there is a balance due on the principal of 
$54, 142. 14, which principal balance is subject to auditing 
and adjustment by either party. This takes into consider-
ation a payment of $2, 800 made this date. The undersigned 
acknowledges that there is no present default in the contract 
payments and that the parties are hereafter bound strictly 
in accordance with the terms of this agreement. M (Exhibits 
D-20, P-5) 
The writer further acknowledges that plaintiffs exhibit 12 shows a 
total balance due under the contract of $63, 298. 64 Defendants do not acknowledge 
that these are the true facts so far as the actual balances due are concerned. As 
quoted above, the modification agreement states that the parties believe the balance 
to be $54. 142. 14. The contract itself acknowledges that there is some doubt and 
provides for an audit and adjustment of the balance by either party. The agree-
ment further provides that with the receipt of a payment of $2, 800, there are 
no defaults in the contract payments. The testimony of the plaintiffs themselves 
will demonstrate that the correct balance should have been $30, 954. 72. 
Mrs. Bagnall testified on direct examination (Tr. Bk. 3, p . 32) 
concerning the $54, 142. 14 balance referred to in the modification agreement, and 
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the method by which they arrived at the balance, as follows: 
Q. All right. Now, how did you arrive at the figure for the 
assumption, the debt, the amount of the contract, the contract figure? 
A. Well, we had records then of the payments of the delinquencies, 
and with help of our attorney, we arrived at this figure. 
On cross examination (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 91) Mr. Barker asked Mr. 
Bagnall, Paragraph three says: It is believed by the undersigned that as of 
August 1, 1962, there is a balance due on the principal of $54. 142. 14, which 
principle balance is subject to auditing and adjustment by either party. !!Now 
what does the word "auditing11 mean to you. If 
A. It meant a check might be made of it according to the to 
the records that we had and so forth, I suppose. I don!t know. 
On cross examination (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 89) Mr. Bagnall admits 
that the payment records prior to July 16, 1962, are not available and that an 
audit would be impossible without them. On page 90 he states that there was 
never any request for an audit. Such statement is not very pursuasive, however, 
since he could not even remember the request for an accounting contained in the 
tender letters, (pp. 90) 
And finally, a look at the testimony of Don Tibbs (Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 104, 
105) reveals the following colloquy: 
Q. Wherenft you concerned about dealing with somebody who didn't 
present any documents? 
A. I figured if we could get the money out of them and bring that 
contract up to date that I would let them worry about it. 
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Then further down on the page he says: 
11
 . . . but I thought that if he could bring that contract 
current and the persons claiming under the purchaser 
would pay, that fs all Mr. Bagnall wanted. He wanted 
the money that was due him under the contract and that 
was all and I thought this was the best way of getting it 
to that point and frankly, when Mr. Maxfield showed up 
with so much money, I thought it was a good deal, I 
thought the deal was over. I dismissed my Lawsuit and 
he paid the money and he paid me my attorney's fee and 
I thought it was all said and done except for some miscel-
laneous things that there was something wrong with the 
title which wouldn't show up until the abstract was 
completed. " 
Plaintiffs, on page five of their brief state that Maxfield 
made payment of the delinquencies in small denomination bills, and Maxfield 
testified on direct that he was not satisfied with the $54. 142. 14 balance and 
Mr. Tibbs said that in order to get the matter settled he could audit the account. 
(Tr. Bk. 2, p. 236). Put this all together, and what do we have? We simply 
have a contract that was only seven months delinquent in 1962. Payment of 
that delinquency in the amount of $2, 800 was made and all parties acknowledged 
that all delinquent payments had been made. That state of facts was inconsistent 
with the stated balance due, and the account was to be reviewed and adjusted. How 
could this be done? Mr. Bagnall states that the records were subsequently lost 
and that without them an audit could not be performed. If that be true, then we 
must ,fauditn from the documents and the testimony of the parties. 
If payment of the $2, 800 paid all delinquent payments (the parties 
and the agreement itself say that it does), then the $400 monthly payments must 
be considered to have been made between September 1, 1952, and July 16, 1962. 
Apportioning those payments to principal and interest we discover that the total 
sum of $21, 277. 34 has been paid in interest, and the total sum of $24, 277. 66 paid 
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on the principal, bringing the balance due, as of August 1, 1962, to $30, 954. 72. 
With this state of affairs, the Court will readily see that defendants clearly 
needed an accounting before they could effect their tenders, and the court will 
see why defendants did not make reference in their appeal brief to the 
amounts plaintiffs claimed to be due and owing. 
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POINT VII 
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ARGUMENTS 
OF APPELLANTS BRIEF COMPEL A JUDGMENT FOR THE APPELLANTS 
Appellants have t r ied, consistent ly to base the i r a rguments upon 
the legal and factual i s sues as they developed before, during, and after the t r i a l . 
Respondents , for the mos t par t , have attacked the c h a r a c t e r and integr i ty of 
appellants as well as the i r counsel. Except for the i r point number 10, which 
was a s t ra ight foreward legal argument , vi r tual ly everything e lse in t he i r br ief 
boils down to the position that the appellants a r e conniving, lieing, cheating, 
d isreputable c h a r a c t e r s and therefore judgment for the plaintiffs, who a r e honest, 
hardworking, s ta lwar t p i l l a r s of the community should be affirmed. In addition 
to al l that has been said he re in concerning the re la t ive m e r i t s of plaintiffs and 
defendants posi t ions, these final comments will help i l luminate the shal lowness 
of the plaintiffs a rgument s . 
1. Point 1 of appellants appeal brief l i s t s 10 major defects in the 
t i t le to the land the s e l l e r s we re supposed to del iver to the buye r s . Those defects 
consis ted of the following: 
1) Encroachment of the r a i l road r ight of way. 
2) Encroachment of the county road. 
3) Loss of 1/2 in t e re s t in 140. 15 a c r e s . 
4) Loss of the fee s imple in te res t in . 57 a c r e s containing the 
res idences . , 
5) P r o p e r t y in the name of s e l l e r s ' son J. A. Bagnall . 
6) P r i v a t e ea semen t s . 
7) Unre leased lis pendens. 
o o 
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8) 1. 5 a c r e s in name of Sharp and Hansen. 
9) Oil and gas l eases . 
10) F a i l u r e to deposit wa te r stock within the t ime allowed by the 
contrac t . 
In r e sponse to appellants1 a rgument about these defects, the plaintiffs1 
brief responds to only two of the admit ted defects, i. e. the oil and gas l eases , and 
the problem concerning the 140. 15 a c r e s . In at tempting to justify o r excuse the 
defect evident in the t i t le to the 140. 15 a c r e s , plaintiffs s ta te on page L8 of the i r 
brief that: 
"Cont ra ry to the a s s e r t i o n s of the appel lants , the 
question of marke tab le t i t le was never a point of i ssue 
s ince Maxfield r ep re sen ted to Mr. Tibbs and to the 
s e l l e r s that he had acquired all of the balance of the 
outstanding in te res t of the p a r t i e s . " (Emphasis added.) 
Even if that were t rue , which it is not, the defects caused by the 
r a i l road r ight of way, the county, road, the p rope r ty in J. A. Bagnal l ' s name, 
the unre leased lis pendens, the pr iva te ea semen t s , and the ac reage in the name 
of Sharp and Hansen, s t i l l m u s t be contended with. 
2. Point II of appellants appeal brief d i s cus se s the wri t ten tender 
made by defendants, and the legal effects thereof. Appellants r a i s ed the following 
cons idera t ions , among o the r s , in support of the validity of the i r t ende r s : 
1) Wri t ten t ender s t e rmina ted s e l l e r s r ight to default. 
2) Se l le rs demanded the acce le ra ted balance which they had no 
r ight to do. 
3) Statute makes proof of abili ty to pay i r r e levan t . 
4) Tes t of abil i ty to pay would have been for s e l l e r s to accept tender., 
5) Legal meaning of the Hymas , Bamberge r , and Seiver ts c a s e s . 
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6) Weight of evidence shows abili ty to pay. 
7) Se l le rs stipulated that t enders were never accepted. 
In response to appellants brief, plaintiffs a rgue only that the 
weight of evidence shows the buyers were unable to pe r fo rm the i r t ende r s . All 
of the other six a rguments r a i s ed by appellants a r e unanswered by the plaintiffs, 
and in fact plaintiff specifically refuses to be drawn into a response to defendants 
a rgument that the t enders a r e effective r e g a r d l e s s of any showing, at this late 
date, of buyers ability o r lack of abili ty to per form. They s tate on page 24 that 
, fit s e e m s futile for respondents to argue the law n . The w r i t e r quite a g r e e s with 
that last s ta tement , inasmuch as the law, in w r i t e r ' s opinion, completely 
suppor ts the defendants1 posit ion. 
3. In r e sponse to the a rguments made by appellants in t he i r point 
III, plaintiffs make the false s ta tement that s e l l e r s never refused to give an 
accounting. Point V contained here in shows by the plaintiffs own tes t imony 
that an accounting was , in fact, never given. Plaintiffs make no r e sponse to the 
author i t ies cited by defendants to support the legal r equ i remen t of an accounting 
when reques ted by the buyer . 
4. In point IV, appel lants , in the i r appeal brief, d i scussed the 
r e a s o n s why the s e l l e r s notice of default was defective, r a i s ing at least the 
following quest ions: 
1) The wording of the notice is ambiguous. 
2) Demands m o r e than is due, improper ly acce le ra t ing the balance 
due under the contrac t . 
3) Reasons the amounts could not be known to the defendants. 
4) Citation of author i t ies and the i r effect on th is case . 
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Plaintiffs1 response, when all of the chaff is blown away, is to 
the effect that the t r ia l court found the notice valid, and that is that. 
5. In point V of defendants1 appeal brief the effect of the payment 
of $400 to the escrow by the buyers after the service of the sel lers notice of 
default was discussed. The following arguments were presented by defendants: 
1) The bank, for purposes of receiving the payments, was the 
agent of the sellers only. 
2) The notice to quit was inconsistent with the notice of default, 
thereby, waiving the default. 
3) Bagnalls affirmation of the authority of the escrow, after default. 
4) The legal effect of the acceptance of the payment by the bank. 
In response to these arguments, plaintiffs refer to the spurious 
Exhibit D-ll, and the non-existent order of Judge Erickson, to show that the 
payment was never accepted. They then go on to allege that because Erickson 
ruled against defendants on this point, the affidavit of prejudice was filed by 
defendants thereby obtaining a new judge. The wri ter can only say that the 
affidavit speaks for itself, and was filed by counsel only after much soul searching, 
and because of the firm belief that the judge had already determined how he wanted 
the case to go as evidenced by his prediliction to rule adversely to the defendants 
on motions before they had been heard, and his tendency to make rulings on matters 
not even raised or argued by counsel. 
For all practical purposes, plaintiffs make no meaningful response 
to any of the arguments raised by defendants on this point. 
- 3 6 -
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6. In point VI of the appeal brief, appellants make the point that 
the i r proffers of proof before Judge Er ickson and the i r offer to pay the money 
into court should waive any default and re ins t a t e the cont rac t . Defendants make 
the following points: 
1) Proffer of $80, 000 worth of savings cer t i f ica tes to Judge 
Er ickson, who refused the proffer. 
2) Offer to pay $65, 000 into the r e g i s t r y of the court , and Judge 
Hardings r e sponse that it would not be n e c e s s a r y . 
3) The set t ing up, by defendants, of an independant escrow of 
$65, 000 for payment to the plaintiffs. 
4) The buyers r ights of redemption. 
The only r e sponse plaintiffs make to any of this is the tac i t 
admiss ion that payment into the r e g i s t r y of court , o r i ts equivalent, would 
r e ins t a t e the contract , and then they simply say that payment should have been 
made to the court . All o ther m a t t e r s r a i s ed by defendants a r e s imply ignored in 
the plaintiff s brief. 
' 7. In point IX of appellants appeal brief, the following contradict ions 
in the plaintiffs f tes t imony were l isted: 
1) Mr. Bagnall test if ied that the beginning balance set forth in 
the modification agreement was a r r i ved at from the sketchy r e c o r d s which they had. 
M r s . Bagnall testified that they had complete and well kept r e c o r d s p r epa red by a 
c . p . A.- :•• - :- ' '-'-V/. 
2) J. R. Bagnal l denied eve r using his son ' s name, yet he did use 
it as one of his own in a w a r r a n t y deed which he s tated in his deposition was an 
at tempt to c l ea r the t i t le . 
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3) Plaintiffs c la imed they never heard of any corpora t ion o ther 
than the Idaho corporat ion. Tibbs, the i r then at torney, test if ied that they knew 
of the Nevada corporat ion and authorized the ass ignment from the Idaho to the 
Nevada corporat ion. In addition they executed a deed to the Nevada corpora t ion . 
4) Bagnall c la imed ownership to a t r a c t of 17. 45 a c r e s and said, 
in h is deposition that he had never been paid for it. After the defendants conclusively 
proved that plaintiffs had no c la im to the 17. 45 a c r e s and had been paid in full 
therefore in 1962, Mr. Howard st ipulated to the cour t that they w e r e making no 
c la im there to . 
5) Mr. Bagnall testified at the t r ia l , as a rebut ta l wi tness , that Mr . 
Maxfield had made only one t r ip to Bagnal ls 1 home in California. In h is deposition, 
Bagnall test if ied to th ree t r i p s . 
6) Bagnal ls and the i r at torney, s t ipulated at p r e - t r i a l that none of 
the t ender had been accepted. At the t r i a l , Bagnall testified that he o ra l ly 
accepted the July 5, 1969, tender . 
7) Mr. Bagnall testified that she had never s tated they would not 
take payments , but were de termined to get the ground back. Mr. Bagnall test if ied 
that she in fact made such a s ta tement . < 
/Ht/^r 
In r e sponse to these l isted d i sc repenc ies , plaintiffs only as®€rte that 
they a r e minor and inconsequential . Minor and inconsequent ia l?! Had plaintiffs 
had the i r way, they would have sought, and obtained, judgment grant ing them t i t le 
to 17. 45 a c r e s to which they c l ea r ly had no r ight . Cer ta in ly the question of „ 
whether they accepted o r re jec ted the defendants1 tender offers is m o r e than a 
m ino r and inconsequential d iscrepency. What c redence can be given to Bagnal l s 
t e s t imony (unbelieveable in itself) that he re l ied upon Mr. Maxfields r ep re sen t a t i ons 
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when he issued a warranty deed to property subject to defects of title, when 
he cannot even remember whether he had been paid for the 17. 45 acres, cannot 
remember whether the defendants tenders had ever been accepted, cannot even 
recall a corporation (Nevada) to which he had issued deeds, and authorized the 
assignment of the contract, and etc. 
CONCLUSION 
The very flagrant manner in which the respondents, through 
their counsel, have sought to mislead the court by means of their erroneous and 
fabricated "statement of facts" constitutes a gross abuse of counsel's obligations 
and responsibilities to the court, and should be sufficient to warrant the court in 
disregarding plaintiffs1 brief in its entirety. The writer does not lightly attack 
counsel for the other side, however, the direct attack upon the integrity of the 
writer by counsel for the plaintiffs leaves this writer no alternative but to point 
out the e r rors and defalcations perpetrated by the writer of plaintiffs1 brief. 
After all the smoke and noise of battle has cleared away in this 
case, at least one thing remains crystal clear. That is the fact that the written 
documents, i. e. the modification agreement, the 1952 contract, the warranty 
deed put into escrow, and the letter of July 13, all explicitly require the plaintiffs 
to deliver a marketable title free of encumbrances, liens, easements, encroachments, 
adverse claims, and etc. This the plaintiffs were just as clearly unable to do. 
Their sole defense is that Mr. Maxfield, at the time the modification agreement 
was signed stated to them that he had all the outstanding titles and had deeds 
to them. As was argued above, such a defense is unbelieveable, and is itself 
at variance with the modification agreement which clearly states that he represented 
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to them that he had acquired the buyers interest under the contract. 
Their attempt to vary the plain meaning of the written instruments 
by parol evidence should not be allowed. 
The Bank of Ephriam, acting solely as agent for the Bagnall, so 
far as the receipt and disbursement of the payments was concerned, and before 
any notice was given to them to terminate their agency, accepted a regular monthly 
payment of $400, and, thereby, waived and invalidated the Notice of Forfeiture. The 
use of the escrow by the Bagnalls thereafter, reinforced the fact that the escrow 
was still operative and had authority to act. 
The court has before it, all necessary portions of the record and 
the t ranscr ip t of testimony. The testimony and the exhibits compel the court 
to make a finding in favor of the defendants. 
Contrary to respondents assertions that they never refused to give 
the appellants an accounting, it is clear from the testimony that they in fact did not 
do so after buyers request as contained in their letters of tender. As was discussed 
in point VI herein, an accounting or statement of some kind from the plaintiffs 
was necessary before the defendants could determine what amount of money would 
be required to clear the delinquencies. The courts have held, in the proper 
circumstances, that failure to give an accounting when requested is sufficient 
grounds to prevent the buyers default for failure to pay. 
It appears to the wri ter that the plaintiffs, in their reply brief, 
are grasping at straws and have chosen to attack the defendants in the areas which 
they consider to be the weakest, and to ignore all arguments for which they have no 
answer. Their failure to respond to many of the issues presented by appellants1 
appeal brief, constitutes a tacit admission of the validity of the points made by 
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appellants. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth 
in appellants appeal brief on file herein, the judgment should be reversed, the 
complaint dismissed, the contract reinstated, and the matter remanded to the 
district court for determination of the balance due under the contract, the amount 
of the delinquencies, the amount of credits and offsets due appellants, and for such 
other relief as maybe appropriate. 
Costs and attorney fees should be awarded to the appellants -
defendants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Robert L. Lord 
118 Metro Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants 
I here by certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing, postage 
prepaid, to Jackson Howard, for : HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON, 120 East 
300 North, Provo, Utah 84601, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents, this 
5th day of September, 1975. 
ROBERT L. LORD 
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APPENDIX f,Au 
RESTATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 1, 1952, a rea l estate agreement was entered into 
between Hannah Bagnall and J. R. Bagnall, as sel lers , and Wallace J. Nyberg, 
Jean B. Nyberg, and Glenna A. Nyberg, as buyers. (Exhibits P-3 and P-4) 
The agreement appears to have been part of an overall settlement of the estate of 
Hannah Bagnall, with the apparent motive being to divide up the estate at that time, 
and as it later turned out, to avoid a probate. (Tibbs cross examination Tr . Bk. 1, 
pp. 71-72; Bagnall deposition pp. 6 and 7; Maxfield direct, Tr . Bk. 2, p. 278) 
Jean Nyberg, adopted daughter to Hannah, and one of the purchasers under the 
agreement, was the owner in fee, apart from any interest acquired under the 
contract, of . 57 acres on which one of the two homes on the property was 
located, by virtue of a warranty deed dated January 20, 1939, from Joseph and 
Hannah Bagnall. (Abst. vol. 107, p. 112, Exhb. P-8). She was also the owner of an 
undivided 1/2 interest in 140. 15 acres of the land covered by the real estate agree-
ment. She held that interest as co-tenant with her brother, J. R. Bagnall, by 
virtue of a warrancy deed dated January 30, 1939, by which Joseph F. Bagnall, 
and Hannah Bagnall conveyed to the plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, and to his sister , Jean 
B. Nyberg, an undivided 1/2 interest in the said 140. 15 acres . (Stipulated and included 
in pre - t r ia l order, R-55, 56). The real estate agreement also provided that Jean 
had been given a $32, 000 interest out of Hannah's share, leaving a balance of $80, 000 
equally divided between the two sel lers , Hannah and J. R. Bagnall. {Real Estate 
Agreement, P-4) 
The real estate agreement was subsequently assigned to various 
part ies, until it was acquired by Suburbia Land Company of Idaho in July, 1962. 
A - 1 
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(See Bagnall testimony, Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 7, 115). At that time, a modification 
agreement was entered into between J. R. Bagnall and his wife, Florence as the 
sel lers, and Suburbia Land Company as buyer. (Exhibits P-5 and D-20) The 
modification agreement incorporated the original September 1, 1952, agreement 
and made certain modifications therein. Among other changes, the sellers agreed 
to place a warranty deed conveying good and marketable title, together with all 
shares of water stock owned by them, in escrow at the Bank of Ephriam. They 
also agreed to deliver to the defendants an up-to-date abstract "as soon as possible", 
and to clear up any defects that may be shown in the title within 18 months from 
the date of the modification agreement. (See modification agreement, P-5 , 
and Bagnall's letter of July 18, D-20) The defendants herein contend that the 
sel lers were to render a title opinion ! ,as soon as possible" also. (See defendants 
Answer to Amended Complaint; Maxfield testimony Tr . Bk. 2, p. 236.) 
On March 3, 1962 , four and one-half months prior to the assignment 
to Suburbia and the execution of the modification agreement, Jean Nyberg, by 
warranty deed, deeded the aforementioned 140.15 acres and the . 57 acres to Utah 
Valley Land and Development Corporation. (See R-72 and Exhibit P-56). The deed 
purported to convey a fee simple title to all of the land. (P-56, R-72). Mrs. Nyberg 
held the . 57 acres (upon which the main residence was located) in fee, but had only 
an undivided one-half interest in the 140. 15 acres . (Exhibit D-38; Nielsen Tr . Bk. 
2, p. 217; Maxfield Tr . Bk. 2, pp. 234 et. pretr ial stipulations, R-55, 56), The 
milking barn, tack room, corrals , and the bulk of all other improvements, with the 
exception of the two residences, were located on the 140.15 acre tract . (Maxfield 
Tr . Bk. 2, pp. 233, 234; Exhibit D-38) 
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On October 5, 1971, Utah Valley Land conveyed those same interests, 
by warranty deed, to United Paint and Colors Company, one of the defendants named 
in plaintiffs1 amended, amended complaint. (Exhibit P-55) An order of Summary 
Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title was granted in favor of United Paint and Colors 
Company on March 26, 1974. by the above entitled court, thereby effectively 
depriving the appellants of a 1/2 interest in the central part of the ranch containing 
70% of the improvements. (R-73-75; Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 234 et. seq.) The 
matter of the . 57 acres has not yet been litigated. 
One of the major concerns of Suburbia as buyer was the ability of 
the sel lers to deliver an unclouded title. The sellers agreed to take upon them-
selves the burden of preparing an abstract and clearing any defects in the title. 
(Exhibit P-6; Tibbs Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 88, 89) It was the contention of the buyers that 
sel lers were to render the title opinion also. That contention was disputed by the 
plaintiffs at the trial . (Bagnall deposition, p. 35; Maxfield Tr . Bk. 2, p. 202; 
Appellants Answer to Amended Complaint R-252) In any event, the Modification 
Agreement (which consisted of the Agreement dated July 16, 1962, in conjunction 
with a letter from seller to buyer dated July 18, 1962), provided that the sel lers 
were to complete their obligations within 18 months. (Exhibits P-5 and P-6; 
Pre t r ia l order R-53) The abstract was not completed until sometime in 1965, 
according to the testimony elicited from the plaintiffs and their former attorney 
and was never delivered to the defendants. (Tibbs Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 102, 103; Pre 
t r ia l stipulations R-56). _ . 
Plaintiffs took no action to clear any defects, maintaining that they had 
an unclouded title, even to the 140. 15 acres and the . 57 acres , and that if was fully 
marketable and complied with their obligations under the Real Estate Agreement and 
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the Modification Agreement. (Tibbs, Tr. Bk. 1, p. 69; Bagnall deposition p. 15), 
Throughout much of 1962 and through 1965, at least, Mr. Maxfield made constant 
and repeated efforts to obtain the abstract from the plaintiffs or their attorney, 
Don V. Tibbs. (Tibbs Tr. Bk. 1, p. 102), Beginning in 1963, and continuing 
throughout 1965, Mr. Maxfield advised the plaintiffs of numerous title deficiencies. 
(Tibbs, Tr . Bk. 1, pp. 91-94; Exhibit D-21; Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, p. 273) He advised 
them of claims made by third parties to the 140.15 acres which Jean Nyberg had 
deeded away. (Defendants were not then aware of the problem with the . 57 acres). 
He advised them of claims made by a Mr. Don Powell to a 63 acre tract and to a 
76. 94 acres tract , and so forth. It was undisputed that Maxfield obtained deeds 
from Mr. Powell, that he deeded the property therein to the Bagnalls, and that 
they, in turn deeded it back to Suburbia of Nevada (one of the successor corporations). 
(Maxfield Tr . Bk. 2, pp. 274-2 77; Bagnall deposition pp. 57,59) There was dispute at 
the t r ia l as to the reasons therefore, and the effect thereof. Defendants maintained 
that it was to clear up some of the title defects and that plaintiffs agreed to a 
moratorium on payments until December, 1971. Plaintiffs disagreed with that 
contention, denying that there had been any moratorium. (Maxfield Tr . Bk. 2, 
p. 279; Exhibit D-30; Tr. 93-105). 
During much of this time, and especially beginning in 1964, the 
defendants were not making all of their payments. It was their contention that 
many of those payments were missed with approval of the plaintiffs because of 
their failure to obtain the abstract and to clear up the title defects. (Bagnall 
deposition p. 89; Maxfield Tr . Bk. 3, pp. 93-105) Also the plaintiffs were in 
default. As stated, they did not obtain the abstract until 1965. (Tibbs, Tr . Bk. 1, 
pp. 102,103) They did not deliver it to the defendants. (Pre-trial stipulations, R-56) 
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They did not render a title opinion. They did not have all of the water stock in 
the escrow as agreed until 1973! (Exhibit D-13; Bagnall, Tr . Bk. 3 , p. 54; Anderson 
Tr . Bk. 1, p. 24). Joseph Albert Bagnall, son of the plaintiff, is the owner of 
record of approximately 5. 56 acres of the ground. (Abst. vol. 105,p.37) the Denver 
and Rio Grande Western Railway is the owner in fee simple of a strip one chain 
by 40 chains along the eastern boundary and has an easement continuing along 
the balance of the eastern boundary of the ranch, all taking about 3 acres . There 
is a county road running through the middle of the ranch not mentioned in the contract 
or the warranty deed consuming 2 acres . (P-7 Wanlass , Tr. Bk. 2, p. 345-359) 
Defendants allege a private easement consuming about one acre also runs through 
the ranch and is not mentioned in any of the conveyances of agreements. 
On April 25, 1962, suit was commenced to forfeit the agreement 
and a lis pendens was recorded. (Abstract p 183). That lis pendens has not been 
removed of record and constitutes a cloud on the title. On February 18, 1970, 
plaintiff entered into an oil and gas lease to Phillips Petroleum which included 
all of the property contemplated in the Real Estate Agreement (which even included 
the property belonging to J. A. Bagnall and 17. 54 acres of land which the buyers 
had purchased outright at the time of the signing of the modification agreement in 
1962), wherein they purported to lease all of the oil and gas rights to the property, 
as well as all of the water rights with the exception of well waters . (Exhibit D-34; 
Exhibit D-33; Bagnall Tr . Bk. 2, p. 77, 33) This, of course, constituted a deliberate 
cloud upon the title, even though Phillips probably could not prevail in a suit with 
the buyers. (See ruling in the pre- t r ia l order) 
During the latter part of June, 1969, it became apparent to Reed R. 
Maxfield, acting on behalf of Suburbia Land Company, of Utah, that the plaintiffs 
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could not comply with their agreement and were about to attempt forfeiture of the 
contract. On July 5, 1969, Mr. Maxfield, acting on behalf of Suburbia, made a 
written tender to plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, of "any and all amounts that are due 
. . . under the terms of . . . (the) real estate contract. ,f As part of that tender 
Suburbia asked the plaintiffs to tell them how much was due. There were no 
restrictions or conditions attached to the tender. (Exhibit P-15) Plaintiffs 
rejected the tender and asked, instead, not for the delinquencies due under the 
contract, but demanded the full accelerated balance due in two separate let ters . 
(Pre-trial order, R-52; Exhibits P-16 and P-17) There was no provision in the 
contract for an acceleration. (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 166; Exhibit P-4) Defendants again 
tendered, in writing, payment of the delinquencies, without acceleration, and 
asked the plaintiffs to set forth the amount. (Exhibit P-18). That tender was 
never accepted by the plaintiffs either (Pre- t r ia l stipulation, R-57). 
Within a few days of the July 5 tender, Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall went to 
the Maxfields' house on the ranch at Chester. They testified that they came to accept 
the tender (a position wholly contrary to their stipulation that they never accepted 
the tender), while the defendants testified that they were told by the Bagnails 
at that time that they did not want the money, they were determined to take the 
ranch back. (Bagnall Tr. Bk. 2, p. 109; Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, p. 299; P re - t r i a l 
stipulation R-57) 
On July 31, 1970, a notice of default was served upon Reed R. 
Maxfield, demanding the whole of the accelerated balance due under the agreement, 
together with interest and penalties in an unspecified amount, and taxes. (P-31) 
Lester Romero, then president of Suburbia of Utah, the only surviving corporation, 
was advised of the notice and contacted plaintiffs1 attorney, Merlin O. Baker, and 
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once again tendered payment in writing of all amounts actually due on the contract 
and asked the plaintiffs to specify the amount due. (Exhibit P-32). The t r ia l 
court ruled this tender to be timely and within the time allotted by the plaintiffs 
in their notice of forfeiture. (R-53) The notice of forfeiture was obviously in error , 
having asked for the accelerated balance ($48, 535, 70 plus taxes and interest) 
contrary to the provisions of the contract. There were various letters back and 
forth thereafter, Suburbia each time tendering payment of the delinquencies. 
(Exhibits P-34, 35, 36). Plaintiffs refused to acknowledge that Suburbia of Utah, 
or Lester Romero, had anything to do with the agreement and proceeded with suit 
against the Idaho corporation filed about November 4, 1970. (R-l)* It was not until 
October, 1971, that the Nevada and Utah corporations, together with Lester R. 
Romero were joined as defendants. (See plaintiffs' amended complaint filed 
October 28, 1971). 
Then on August 19, 1971, the plaintiffs completely reversed 
themselves, repudiated the contract, (and, defendants believe, waived their notice 
of default) by mailing a Notice to Quit to the defendants Maxfield, advising them 
that the Modification Agreement was void and that they were considered tenants 
at will and giving them five days to quit the premises. (P-46). 
On December 1, 1971, defendants delivered to the escrow, the Bank 
of Ephriam, a regular monthly payment for $400, which sum the bank accepted, 
receipted, and posted to interest on December 1, 1971. (Exhibit D-18; Anderson 
Tr. Bk. I, p. 53). It should be noted that the plaintiffs had never notified the escrow 
of their notice of forfeiture, It is the defendants' position that the acceptance of 
this payment, after notice of default, effectively waived the default and the contract 
must be re-instated, if indeed, it ever was in default 
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After many motions and countermotions — After long and involved 
pre- t r ia l hearings, and after much pain and suffering on both sides, the t r ia l 
herein commenced in the Sanpete County Courthouse on April 22, 1974, before 
the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge pro-tem. It is from the results of that 
t r ial that defendants take this appeal. 
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